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tions are, in this state at least, determinable by the National 
Board. 
The court had no jurisdiction, therefore, to grant the in-
junction and I would reverse the order. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 21803. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
HARRY RUBIN, Respondent, v. AMERICAN SPORTS-
MEN TELEVISION EQUITY SOCIETY et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[L. A. No. 21847. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
MIKE HIRSCH ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondent, v. 
AMERICAN SPORTSMEN TELEVISION. EQUITY 
SOCIETY et al., Appellants. 
[1] Labor-Findings and Conclusions.-Where the question of de-
fendant television society's claimed organizational and picket-
ing rights concerns wrestlers whose contests are televised, 
but the evidence is neither clear nor conclusive that such 
wrestlers are employees of plaintiff promoters and not inde-
pendent contractors, and the factual problem involved be-
cause of exclusion of independent contractors from the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act is not necessarily finally resolved 
by the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the trial court 
is justified, pending a hearing on the merits, in coming to 
the tentative conclusion that the relationship falls into an 
"entrepreneurial enterprise," rather than into employment sub-
ject to the protections of the federal act. 
[2] Id.-Jurisdiction.-If the jurisdictional issue involved in de-
fendant society's televising of wrestling contests is resolved 
by a determination that wrestlers are independent contractors 
and thus excluded from the National Labor Relations Act, 
judicial investigation of the bona fides of defendant as a 
labor organization can take place only in the state forum. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Labor, § 29; [2, 3] Labor, § 24; 
[ 4] Labor, § 18; [ 5, 6] Labor, § 25. 
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[3] !d.-Issues and Determination.-An attempt by defendant 
television society to qualify as a labor organization under the 
National Labor Relations Act does not settle the question 
in actions to enjoin such society from picketing plaintiffs' 
places of business, since the issues are not so much matters 
of constitutional right as they are problems presented to 
the state in the application of state policy in an endeavor 
to maintain peaceful labor-management equilibrium. 
[4] !d.-Labor Interest or'Labor Representation.-No simple test 
may be applied to determine questions of labor interest or 
of labor representation, since the wide variations in the forms 
of employee self-organization and the complexities of modern 
industrial organization make difficult the use of inflexible 
rules as the test. 
[5a, 5b] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-Where the facts presented in 
actions to enjoin defendant television society from 'picketing 
plaintiffs' places of business indicate a serious doubt as to 
the existence of the elements which would support defend-
ant's claim of bona fide collective bargaining agency on be-
half of wrestlers booked by plaintiffs in televised events, the 
court is justified in concluding by issuance of preliminary 
injunction orders, that it is desirable to preserve the status 
quo of the parties pending a hearing on the merits, and that 
plaintiffs were more likely to be injured by a denial of such 
temporary relief than defendants were likely to sustain in-
jury by the granting of it. 
[6] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-Concerted activity for an objective 
which is not reasonably related to any legitimate interest 
of organized labor may be enjoined. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County granting preliminary injunctions. W. Turney 
Fox, Judge. Affirmed. 
Richard A. Perkins and W. M. Freiburghouse for Appel-
lants. 
John C. Stevenson and I_.~ionel Richman as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellants. 
Cyril Moss and George Appell for Respondents. 
SHENK, ,J.--'rhe appeals in these cases are by the de-
fendants from preliminary injunction orders. The plaintiffs 
eommeuced the actions for injunctive relief against the same 
[6] See 7 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor, §§ 43, 44; 
Am.Jur., Labor, § 265 et seq. 
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defendants to restrain picketing after the plaintiffs' refusal 
to sign a tendered labor agreement on behalf of wrestlers 
performing in television events. Essentially similar circum-
stances are involved in each case. The hearing on the appli-
cation for a preliminary injunction disclosed the following 
alleged and averred salient facts: 
The plaintiffs are promoters of professional wrestling 
matches in Los Angeles County. 'rhey book the contestants 
and pay them for their activity as wrestlers. The wrestling 
events have been televised since April, 1950, through the offices 
of a telecasting corporation which pays a compensation directly 
to the participants for television rights. The licensing and 
regulation of wrestling contests are under the jurisdiction 
of the State Athletic Commission. 
The defendant American Sportsmen 'relevision Equity So-
ciety, Inc., herein called 'l'elevision Equity or the society, 
is a corporation organized in this state with its principal 
place of business in Los Angeles County. The individual 
defendants, at least one of whom is a wrestler, are officers and 
directors of the corporation. Television Equity is not affiliated 
with a labor organization although an unsuccessful attempt 
was made to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor. 
The society has filed with the United States Department of 
Labor copies of its constitution, by-laws, and certain reports 
and affidavits required by the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, 1947. These documents are not included in the record. 
The society has been certificated by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board as having complied with the requirements. Forms 
of application for membership in Television Equity and of a 
labor agreement, designated as a ''Code of Fair Play,'' are 
in the record. To the plaintiffs' knowledge none of the booked 
1vrestlers is a member of the organizaiton. 
f n September and October of 1950 the defendants asked 
t"he plaintiffr-; to sign the labor agreement which would require 
them to book only wrestlers who are or would become members 
of 'relevision Equity. The plaintiffs refused the request on 
the ground that the society was not a bona fide labor organ-
ization. Thereup'on the defendants placed or threatened to 
place pickE~ts at the entrances to the arenas. The plaintiffs 
file(] their complaints and obtained an order to show cause. 
'l'he hearing was had on the verified complaints and on affi-
davits filed by the defendants. The appeals present for review 
the propriety of the action of the court pursuant to its dis-
lVIar.1953] RunrN v. il.:m·JRICAN SPowrRJIIEN rc·rc. SoCIETY ·H:J 
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(•.retionary power in ordPring the JWPliminary injunction pend-
ing a hearing on the merits. 
Tlw matter of state jnri;:;rliet.inn is argtwd. Sin(~C the ques-
tion of the def,•ndants' (•!aimed organizational ancl picketing 
rights coneerns wrestlers whose contests are televised, it is 
assumed that tl1e events are in interstate commerce. This 
involvement is also implied in the certification by the National 
Labor Helatiom Board of the society's complianee with re-
quirements for the filing of reports and affidavits under the 
federal labor relations law. Bnt there has not been any de-
termination by that board of the wrestlers' employment 
relation status. 
Seetion 2 (3) of the }Jational Labor Relations Act (July 5, 
1935, 49 Stats. 449, 450, ch. 372, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3)), 
as amemled by the Labor lVIanagement Helations Act, 194 7 
( 61 Stats. 137) expressly excludes from coverage as an em-
ployee ''any individual having the status of an independent 
(•on tractor." 'l'lw plaintiffs contend that the wrestlers are 
independeut eontractors and therefore not covered by the 
federal law. On the other hand the defendants seek a judicial 
iletermination that the wrestlers are "employees" because 
they reeeive from the plaintiffs some instruction relating to the 
kind of holds and maneuvers to be used to give color to the 
<·on test. 
[1] The evidence in the record is neither clear nor con-
e! usive that the wrestlers are employees and not independent 
eontraetors. Nor do the facts necessarily support a con-
elusive determination that the wrestlers have no employment 
relation with the plaintiffs. (Gf. National Labor· Relations 
Borwcl v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 [64 S.Ct. 851, 
88 I1.Ec1. 1170].) On the present showing the trial court was 
justified in coming to the tentative conclusion that the rela-
tionship falls into that characterized in the Hearst case as 
''entrepreneurial enterprise,'' rather than into employment 
subject to the protections of the federal act. The present 
record suggests no obstruction to the free flow of commerce 
'rhich would be served by employment coverage under the 
federal labor law. Contrary to the considerations involved 
in the Hearst case, the economic factors of the relation be-
tween the plaintiffs or the television corporation and the 
wrestlers do not bear more closely on employment than they 
clo on independent eontractual relationships. The factual 
problem involved because of exclusion of independent con-
tractors from the federal act is not necessarily finally re-
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solved by the issuance of the preliminary injunction. The 
question of the existence of the employment relationship is 
one which it is assumed will be determined on the trial of the 
action. 
Assuming in accordance with the presently implied con-
clusion of the trial court that the wrestlers are independent 
contractors, the defendants nevertheless contend that Tele-
vision Equity has the right to exercise power as a labor organ-
ization and to publicize the labor interest by picketing the 
arenas. 'rhey rely on Bakery &: P. Drivers &: H., I.B.T. v. 
Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 [62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178]; Riviello 
v. Journeyman Barbers etc. Union, 88 Cal.App.2d 499 [199 
P.2d 400]; (cf. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746 [155 P.2d 
343] ) , and similar cases. 
The plaintiffs do not question the general principles in-
volved in the cases relied upon but contend that the defendant 
corporation is not a bona fide labor organization, that it does 
not have trade union status, that there is no legitimate labor 
interest involved, and that a color of labor interest has been 
assumed for the purpose of competing with the plaintiffs for 
control of the television rights of wrestlers in the Los Angeles 
area. 
[2] 'rhe principles relied on do not preclude careful 
scrutiny into the bona fides of the organization and its 
asserted right of representation. In fact the issues ten-
dered would seem to require the court on the trial to investi-
gate all of the surrounding circumstances. If the jurisdic-
tional issue is resolved by a determination that the wrestlers 
are independent contractors, judicial investigation of the bona 
fides of the defendant as a labor organization can take place 
only in the state forum. 
[3] The attempt to qualify as a labor organization under 
the federal act does not settle the question here. (See Inter-
national Brotherhood, C.W. &: H. Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 
470 [70 S.Ct. 773, 94 L.Ed. 995, 13 A.L.R.2d 631] ; Building 
Service Emp. Intl. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 [70 S.Ct. 
784, 94 L.Ed. 1045]; Bautista v. Jones, supra., 25 Cal.2d 
746.) As clearly pointed out in those cases, the issues are not 
so much matters of constitutional right as they are problems 
presented to the state in the application of state policy in an 
endeavor to maintain peaceful labor-management equilibrium. 
[4] No simple test may be applied to determine the ques-
tions of the labor interest or of labor representation. As 
stated in National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publica-
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tions, supra, 322 U.S. at p. 134, the wide variations in the 
forms of employee self-organization and the complexities of 
modern industrial organization make difficult the use of in-
flexible rules as the test. 
It is contended that independent contractors in certain 
circumstances may not assert a right to remain unorganized. 
The plaintiffs urge that the wrestlers have that right. They 
state that any competitive interest is for control between 
equal industrial combatants or lies solely within the ranks 
of the wrestlers on the question whether or not to unionize; 
that consequently no legitimate labor interest has been shown, 
and therefore no reasonable relation to collective bargaining 
has been offered by 'l'elevision Equity on behalf of the wres-
tlers. 
It appears from the defendants' affidavits that the purpose 
of Television Equity is to engage in collective bargaining con-
cerning wages and other conditions of employment of various 
sports artists who engage or may be employed to appear in 
television programs; to advance the welfare of sports artists 
who appear in television programs of any nature, and to 
preserve their rights of self-organization and their rights to 
bargain collectively including rights to engage in concerted 
activity for that purpose. 
Television Equity became an unincorporated association 
early in 1949 and was organized as a corporation in August, 
1950. Its constitution and by-laws were filed with the Labor 
Department in September, 1949, and it was certificated on 
October 16, 1950, as having complied with report and affi-
davit filing requirements of the federal law. The member-
ship application form designates Television Equity as the 
bargaining representative whether the purpose of bargain-
ing relates to conditions in televised events or otherwise; 
but the averred corporate objectives and the contract offered 
to the plaintiffs concern the conditions relating to sports 
artists appearing in televised events. It is averred that the 
membership of the corporation at the time of hearing con-
sisted of forty wrestlers working in the Los Angeles area. 
There is no statement as to whether the members appear in 
television programs. 
[5a] The record justifies the inference that labor status 
of Television Equity has been sought to facilitate its mem-
bership organization work in the Los Angeles area by the 
exercise of the coercive measures. The reasonable inferences 
40 C.2d-14 
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from the factR Rupport a conclusion that the defendants have 
not yet eRtablished the labor interest and the competition with 
organized labor which might secure Television Equity's posi-
tion to demand recognition as the appropriate bargaining 
agent for televised wrestlers in the plaintiffs' arenas. 'l'he 
facts so far presented indicate a serious doubt as to the 
existence of the elements which would support the defend-
ants' claim of bona fide collective bargaining agency on be-
half of the wrestlers booked by the plaintiffs in televised 
events. [6] Concerted activity for an objective which is 
not reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized 
labor may be enjoined. (Building Service Emp. Intl. Union 
v. Gazzam, supm, 339 U.S. 532.) [5b] The doubt thus cre-
ated supports a conclusion of the desirability to retain the 
status quo of the parties pending a hearing on the merits. 
'rhe trial court has so concluded by the issuance of the pre-
liminary injunction orders. It did not abuse its discretion 
in making that determination, nor in concluding that as be-
tween the parties the plaintiffs were more likely to be in-
jured by a denial of the requested temporary relief than 
that the defendants were likely to sustain injury by the 
granting of the preliminary injunction. (Riviello v. Journey-
rnen Barbers etc. Union, supra, 88 Cal.App.2d 499, 510.) 
The orders are affirmed. 
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree with either the reasoning or the result 
reached in the majority opinion. I would write the opinion 
in this case as follows: 
From their verified complaints and affidavits, viewed most 
favorably for plaintiffs, it appears that plaintiffs are pro-
moters of professional wrestling matches in Long Beach and 
Ocean Park, respectively. Defendants are American Tele-
vision Equity Society, and officers and directors of the society. 
According to the affidavit of the society's president, it is 
a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Cali-
fornia primarily for the purpose of acting as collective bar-
gaining agent for its members in respect to improving condi-
tions of employment of various "sports artists" who appear 
on television programs and to establish rules of fair play. In 
Mar. ]95:~] R.umN t'. "\'ILERWAN SFowr,.;AIJm E'rc. SocrE'rY ~lD 
[40 C.2d 412; 254 P.2d 510] 
September, 1949, its predecessor, an unincorporated associa-
tion, filed with the National Ijabor Relations Board an ap-
plication for recognition as a labor organization under the 
National Labor Management Relations Act. Later it filed 
a similar application and was accorded recognition by the 
board as such an organization. Among its members are pro-
fessional wrestlers licensed by the California State Athletic 
Commission. In its form of application for membership the 
applicant states that he appoints the society as his bargain-
ing agent. Plaintiffs allege in their complaints, however, 
that the society is not ''an organization, or agency, or em-
ployee representation committee, or any local unit thereof, in 
which employees participate or exist for the purpose, in whole 
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, 
labor disputes, wages, hours of employment, or conditions 
of work, as provided in Section 1117 of the Labor Code of 
the State of California .... [S]aid Society, Inc., was or-
ganized for the purpose of compelling certain professional 
wrestlers in the State of California to become members of, 
or affiliated with, said defendant corporation so that defend-
ants could and would receive a percentage of the money paid 
to said wrestlers for their television rights." 
There is a dispute as to whether the wrestlers appearing 
in plaintiffs' arenas are their employees or independent con-
tractors. The complaints allege that the relationship of 
employer-employee does not exist; that plaintiffs "book" the 
wrestlers for performances and have an agreement with a 
''certain'' corporation under which the latter has the right 
to televise the matches, for which right the corporation pays 
the ·wrestlers; that plaintiffs exercise no control over the 
manner or method of performance by the wrestlers. De-
fendants' affidavits are to the contrary. 
Further, it is al1eged that none of the wrestlers perform-
ing in matches promoted by plaintiffs belong to the society. 
[n September, 1949, defendants combined to injure plain-
tiffs' businesses, by claiming falsely that the society was a 
bona fide labor organization to safeguard the interests of 
employees, and that a labor cliflpnte between plaintiffs and 
the society existed, when in fact its purpose was to compel 
wrestlers to become members of it so it could receive a per-
eentage of the money paid them for television rights, and 
that no labor dispute exists. ('l'his is denied by defendants.) 
To carry out its purpose of obtaining a percentage of the 
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wrestlers' pay, defendants demanded that plaintiffs sign an 
agreement with the society that plaintiffs would use only 
wrestlers who are or will become members of the society. 
Plaintiffs refused to agree and defendants have picketed and 
threaten to continue to picket their places of business to com-
pel them to sign such an agreement. The pickets carried a 
sign stating "unfair to organized labor." A.s a result of 
the picketing, plaintiffs have lost and will continue to lose 
business. There is no labor dispute between plaintiffs and 
the wrestlers performing at their arenas. The preliminary 
injunctions enjoined the picketing. 
The sharp conflict in the complaint and affidavits is ap-
parent. The preliminary injunction was issued, however, and 
I must accept the view most favorable to plaintiffs, as the 
trial court is the judge of credibility and must resolve the 
conflicts. (Northwestern Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber & S. W. 
Union, 31 Cal.2d 441, 443 [189 P.2d 277].) Plainly, the fore-
going matters alleged by plaintiffs are sufficient to establish 
that professional wrestlers are independent contractors rather 
than employees. It might seem to show also that the sole 
purpose of the society and of its picketing activity and de-
mands is not to advance the working conditions of employees 
or of professional wrestlers as independent contractors. It 
is to compel them to be members of its organization in order 
that it may receive a percentage of the compensation which 
such wrestlers receive for consenting to the broadcast of the 
matches on television. If this is the only purpose or object 
of the society, it would appear to be lacking in lawful ob-
jective, it being merely a scheme whereby the society will 
profit from wrestlers without giving them anything in return. 
I do not know how the members of the society would share 
in the money so obtained, if at all, but if they share equally, 
then a portion of the compensation of each wrestler would 
be shared by all, resulting in wrestlers who commanded 
higher compensation sharing in part with those receiving less. 
The only other possibility that presents itself is that the 
officers of defendant society would consume the profits in 
salaries paid to themselves, and that their activity in picket-
ing or interfering with plaintiffs' businesses has as its ob-
ject a "racket," that is, extorting money from the wrestlers, 
or has no object at all, except that of hurting plaintiffs' 
businesses. 
I do not think that such an interpretation of the complaint 
is reasonable, nor that the trial court so intended to con-
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strue it. It is not alleged that the foregoing purpose was 
the sole one in the latter part of the quotation from the 
complaint, and in the first part, it is alleged that the society 
is not an organization in which employees participate, which 
I construe to mean that wrestlers are independent contractors 
rather than employees and the members of the society con-
sist of the former. In the same tenor it is also alleged that 
there is not a labor dispute between plaintiffs and the wres-
tlers performing in their arenas. But what constitutes a 
labor dispute is indecisive, that term being vague at the best. 
As will be seen from the discussion later herein the pertinent 
factors do not involve such indefinite phrases as "labor dis-
pute," "independent contractors" and "labor organizations." 
The question is, whether the acts of defendants as such are 
justified because of the circumstances. I turn, therefore, to 
the detailed statement in the affidavit of the president of the 
society showing that it is in part organized to improve the 
working conditions of professional wrestlers, whether they 
be called employees or independent contractors, and to deal 
on behalf of its members with those who use their services, 
and to adopt rules of fair play among wrestlers, and that 
the picketing here was done to bring the wrestlers used by 
plaintiffs into its ranks. Thus there is a situation where 
independent contractors whose commodity for sale is services 
-wrestling-join in an association to improve their bargain-
ing position with the buyer of their talents in order that they 
may obtain more advantageous working conditions and com-
pensation. To that end they picket a prospective user of 
their services to compel the ones whose services he is using 
to join the association, and to deal with it in regard to com-
pensation, working conditions and the selection of those who 
shall be participants in the exhibitions. 
Preliminarily, it should be observed, plaintiffs assert that 
there was no economic relation between it and the wrestlers, 
because the wrestlers were paid by a ''certain'' television 
corporation for the right to televise the matches, hence there 
was no relationship between them and the wrestlers at all. 
Plaintiffs allege, however, that they "book" the wrestlers 
for the performances put on by them. Thus it would appear 
that they choose who shall perform, and as they are in the 
promotion business of exhibiting such matches, there is a 
direct connection between them and the wrestlers. More-
over, they also allege that they made a contract with a tele-
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vision corporation whereby they granted the right of tele-
vision to the corporation for a compensation "mutually agreed 
upon.'' The wrestlers were not a party to the agreement. All 
that is alleged is that the eorporation pays compensation to 
the wrestlers for television rights. It certainly cannot be 
said that bringing concerted action at the place where the 
matches are performed and televised, under these circum-
stances, is so remote that it is not justified, assuming the 
concerted activity is otherwise legitimate. 
'l'here is no basis for the injunction, inasmuch as the picket-
ing is not for an unlawful object. The object thereof is to 
persuade the wrestlers engaged by plaintiffs to join the society 
and be represented by it and to have plaintiffs agree to en-
gage wrestlers through the society. 'l'he fact that they are 
independent contractors or that there is not a labor dispute 
or the society is not a labor union in the sense that the 
wrestlers are not employees in the ordinary employer-employee 
relation, does not alter the case. They are offering their 
services-their labor-for sale and have a definite economic 
interest in banding together to more effectively negotiate 
with prospective purchasers on questions of price, working 
conditions, etc. In those respects there is no substantial dif-
ference between an independent contractor and the one with 
whom he contracts and the employer-employee relation. In 
both cases the person is seeking a market for his personal 
services on the best terms obtainable, and in both the pros-
pective user of those services is, generally speaking, an em-
ployer, a user and engager of personal services. The economic 
interests and positions are fundamentally the same. Indeed, 
the interference with plaintiffs' businesses may be privileged 
under a rule that: "One who purposely causes a third per-
son not to enter into or continue a business relation with an-
other in order to influence the other's policy in the conduct 
of his business is privileged, if (a) the actor has an economic 
interest in the matter with reference to which he wishes to 
influence the policy of the other and (b) the desired policy 
does not illegally restrain competition or otherwise violate 
a defined public policy and (c) the means employed are not 
improper." (Rest., Torts, § 771.) 
Thus having common factors, cases in the labor relations 
field are pertinent. Peaceful picketing is lawful "if reason-
ably relevant to working conditions and collective bargaining" 
even though there is no dispute between the employer picketed 
and his employees (C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 
Mar.19fi8] RumN v. Al\rEHICAN SPoR~'SMEN ETC. SociETY 423 
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Cal.2d 389 [106 P.2d 414]) as is picketing to compel inde-
pendent contractors to join a union, there being an appropri-
ate economic connection. ( Emde v. San J oaq~tin County etc. 
Council, 23 Cal.2d 146 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916] ; Riv-
iello v. Journeymen Barbers H. C. Intl. Union, 88 Cal.App. 
2d 499 [199 P.2d 400].) And, in Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 
2d 746 [155 P.2d 343], this court held valid an injunction 
granted to independent peddlers of milk to enjoin a milk 
drivers' union from preventing milk brokers from supplying 
them with milk, because the union would not permit the 
peddlers to join the union, but said: "It (the right to work 
in independent business) is equally subject to peaceful, eco-
nomic pressure by labor organizations seeking legitimate ends, 
such as conditions of work, collective rather than individual 
bargaining, seniority privileges and other methods of ad-
vancement, and the union or closed shop. (See McKay v. Re-
tail Auto S. L. Union No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d 311 [106 P.2d 
373]; C. S. Smith JJfet. Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal.2d 389 
[106 P.2d 414]; Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 
Cal.2d 379 [106 P.2d 403] ; American Federation of Labm· v. 
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 [61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855].) 
"The businessman-·worker operating in an industry or field 
in which he competes with organized workmen may likewise 
be subjected to thr same means of persuasion as any other 
workman to join the union and conform to the conoitions 
regulating union labor." 
I am not relying upon any statute and none has been 
snggested which prohibits the conduct of defendants. Nor 
am I concerned with the recent decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, such as Bnilding Service IiJmp. Intl. Union 
v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045], Inter-
national B1·otherhood, C.W.li. Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 
170 S.Ct. 773, 94 hEd. 995, 13 A.J.J.R.2d 631] and Hughes v. 
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985], 
where the state policy rxpressed by court decision or statute 
or the national policy expressed by Congress were found valid, 
although peacefnl picketing was involved. Here there is no 
state policy, either by statute or court decision, which makes 
defendants' actions unlawful. On the contrary, in analogous 
fields, where the strict employer-employee relation exists, the 
polie~r is to permit such conduct. 
It is urged tl1at the banner "unfair to organizrd labor" 
carried by the piekets was false, because there was no labor 
dispute and the 1vrestlers are not employees; they are inde-
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pendent contractors. I have pointed out, however, that their 
position is substantially the same as organized labor. More-
over, that phrase "is not a falsification of facts and 'to use 
loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the con-
ventional give-and-take in our economic and political con-
troversies- like ''unfair'' or ''fascist'' is not to falsify 
facts.' (Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, supra; see 
Park&; T.I. Corp. v. International etc. of Teamsters, supra.)" 
(In re Blaney, 30 Cal.2d 643, 649 [184 P.2d 892] .) 
I would, therefore, reverse the orders. 
'l'raynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. Carter, ,J., and 'rraynor, ,J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[Crim. Nos. 5264, 5265. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
In re JOHN P. KELLEHER et al., on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Act-Disputes Between Unions. 
-Although a dispute between an employer and one union 
of marine engineers over the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement may have initiated picketing of the employer's 
premises, after that contract has expired and the dispute 
has become one between that union and another similar union 
as to which should have the exclusive right to represent the 
employer's marine engineers the picketing arises out of a 
dispute between two labor organizations, and is within the 
purview of the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, § 1118), 
the employer not having invoked the interference by the 
second union to create a jurisdictional strike situation. 
[2] !d.-Jurisdictional Strike Act-Applicability of Statute.-
Even if marine engineers employed by a steamship company 
are supervisory employees, such fact would not preclude ap-
plication of the Jurisdictional Strike Act to a dispute be-
tween unions as to which of them should have the exclusive 
right to bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of 
such employees, notwithstanding the National Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, § 164, declares that the employer 
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), § 31 et seq; Am. 
Jur., Labor, § 178 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Labor, § 21. 
